CHAPTER 3. ORDERS FROM WHICH APPEALS
MAY BE TAKEN

IN GENERAL

Rule


301.    Requisites for an Appealable Order.
302.    Requisites for Reviewable Issue.

INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS


311.    Interlocutory Appeals as of Right.
312.    Interlocutory Appeals by Permission.
313.    Collateral Orders.

FINAL ORDERS


341.    Final Orders; Generally.
342.    [Rescinded].
342.    Appealable Orphans’ Court Orders.
343.    [Rescinded].

IN GENERAL


Rule 301. Requisites for an Appealable Order.

 (a)  Entry upon docket below.

   (1)  Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subdivision, no order of a court shall be appealable until it has been entered upon the appropriate docket in the lower court. Where under the applicable practice below an order is entered in two or more dockets, the order has been entered for the purposes of appeal when it has been entered in the first appropriate docket.

   (2)  In a criminal case in which no post-sentence motion has been filed, a judgment of sentence is appealable upon the imposition of sentence in open court.

 (b)  Separate document required.—Every order shall be set forth on a separate document.

 (c)  Nonappealable orders.—Except as provided in subdivision (a)(2), a direction by the lower court that a specified judgment, sentence or other order shall be entered, unaccompanied by actual entry of the specified order in the docket, does not constitute an appealable order. Any such order shall be docketed before an appeal is taken.

 (d)  Entry of appealable orders.—Subject to any inconsistent general rule applicable to particular classes of matters, the clerk of the lower court shall on praecipe of any party (except a party who by law may not praecipe for entry of an adverse order) forthwith prepare, sign and enter an appropriate order, judgment or final decree in the docket, evidencing any action from which an appeal lies either as of right or upon permission to appeal or allowance of appeal.

 (e)  Emergency appeals.—Where the exigency of the case is such as to impel an immediate appeal and the party intending to appeal an adverse action is unable to secure the formal entry of an appealable order pursuant to the usual procedures, the party may file in the lower court and serve a praecipe for entry of an adverse order, which action shall constitute entry of an appealable order for the purposes of these rules. The interlocutory or final nature of the action shall not be affected by this subdivision.

   Official Note

   See Rules of Appellate Procedure 311 authorizing interlocutory appeals as of right, 312 authorizing interlocutory appeals by permission, and 341 to 843 authorizing appeals from final orders.

   See also Rules of Appellate Procedure 903 governing time for filing notice of appeal, 1113 governing time for filing petition for allowance of appeal, 1311(b) governing time for filing petition for permission for appeal, and 1512 governing time for filing petition for review.

   The 1986 Amendment to Rule 301 states that no order shall be appealable until entered in the docket and deletes reference to reduction of an order to judgment as a prerequisite for appeal in every case. This deletion does not eliminate the requirement of reduction of any order to judgment in an appropriate case. Due to the variety of orders issued by courts in different kinds of cases, no single rule can delineate the requirements applicable in all cases. The bar is cautioned that if the applicable practice or case law requires that an order be reduced to judgment or final decree before it becomes final, that requirement must still be met before the order can be appealed.

   An appeal may be remanded or subject to other appropriate action of the appellate court when the order is such that it may be reduced to judgment or final decree and entered in the docket but such action has not been taken. Rule 902. Examples of orders which may be remanded under Rule 902 when the order appealed from has not been reduced to judgment or final decree include:

    1. an order denying a motion for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict after a trial by jury, Dennis v. Smith, 288 Pa. Super 185, 431 A.2d 350 (1981);

    2. an order dismissing exceptions to the decision after a trial without jury, Black Top Paving Co., Inc. v. John Carlo, Inc., 292 Pa. Super. 404, 437 A.2d 756 (1981); and

    3. an order dismissing exceptions to the decree nisi in an equity action, Kopchak v. Springer, 292 Pa. Super. 441, 437 A.2d 756 (1981).

   An appeal will also be quashed where the order appealed from is interlocutory and the appeal is not authorized by Rule 311 governing interlocutory appeals as of right or Rule 312 governing interlocutory appeals by permission. Examples of interlocutory orders include:

    1. an order granting a petition for appointment of an arbitrator, Cassidy v. Keystone Ins. Co., 297 Pa. Super. 421, 443 A.2d 1193 (1982); and

    2. an order relating to alimony pendente lite, and interim counsel fees and expenses is not appealable. Fried v. Fried, Pa. , 501 A.2d 211 (1985).

   Subdivision (a) extends former Supreme Court Rule 19A and former Commonwealth Court Rule 29A to the Superior Court. The second sentence of the subdivision codifies Stotsenburg v. Frost, 465 Pa. 187, 348 A.2d 418 (1975).

   The requirement of Subdivision (b) for a separate document is patterned after Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 58, as interpreted in United States v. Indrelunas, 93 S.Ct. 1562, 411 U.S. 216, 36 L.Ed.2d 202 (1973), so as to render certain the date on which an order is entered for purposes of computing the running of the time for appeal. See also Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 98 S.Ct. 1117, 435 U.S. 381, 55 L.Ed.2d.357 (1978) (requirement of separate document may be waived by appellee). This requirement is intended to control over an inconsistent civil (including orphans’ court) or criminal procedural rule, since such rules are not primarily concerned with the appellate process.

   Subdivision (c) sets forth the frequently overlooked requirement for an appealable order that an order must be docketed before it may be appealed. The subdivision also sets forth the rule that an appeal is premature where the Court directs that a judgment sentence or order be entered in the docket and the prothonotary fails to do so. Friedman v. Kasser, 293 Pa. Super. 294, 438 A.2d 1001 (1981). Moreover, an order of Court then directing that a complaint as set forth will be dismissed upon the passage of time or occurrence or failure of an event is not appealable; only a subsequent order of dismissal would be appealable. See Ayre v. Mountaintop Area Joint San. Auth., 58 Pa. Cmwlth. 510, 427 A.2d 1294 (1981).

   This rule does not supersede rules such as Pa. R. Civ. Proc. 237 which impose additional requirements or procedures in connection with filing a praecipe for a final order.

   Subdivision (d) provides a remedy for the appellant where no appealable order has been entered on the docket, and is similar to Pa. R. Civ. P. 227.4. The exception refers to cases such as certain matrimonial matters, where it has been held that the defendant is not entitled to cause an adverse decision to be formally entered as judgment. See, e.g., Mirarchi v. Mirarchi, 226 Pa. Super. 53, 311 A.2d 698 (1973).

   The filing in the lower court required by Subdivision (e) may under Rule 121(a) (filing) be made with a judge of the lower court in connection with an application under Chapter 17 (effect of appeals, supersedeas and stays).

   See Pa.R.A.P. 108 and Explanatory Comment—2007 thereto, Pa.R.A.P. 903(c)(3), and Pa.R.Crim.P. 462, 720, and 721 governing criminal appeals.

Explanatory Comment—1976

   Language clarified to conform to Stotsenburg v. Frost, 465 Pa. 187, 348 A.2d 418 (1975).

Source

   The provisions of this Rule 301 amended through December 10, 1986, effective January 31, 1987, and shall govern all matters thereafter commenced and, insofar as just and practicable, matters then pending, 16 Pa.B. 4591; amended January 18, 2007, effective August 1, 2007, 37 Pa.B. 521. Immediately preceding text appears at serial pages (312363) to (312365).

Rule 302. Requisites for Reviewable Issue.

 (a)  General rule. Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

 (b)  Charge to jury. A general exception to the charge to the jury will not preserve an issue for appeal. Specific exception shall be taken to the language or omission complained of.

   Official Note

   This rule sets forth a frequently overlooked requirement. See, e.g. Commonwealth v. Piper, 458 Pa. 307, 328 A.2d 845 (1974), as to Subdivision (a). See, e.g. Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1974); Commonwealth v. Light, 458 Pa. 328, 326 A.2d 288 (1974) as to Subdivision (b). Rule 2117(c) (statement of place of raising or preservation of issues) and Rule 2119(e) (statement of place of raising or preservation of issues) require that the brief expressly set forth in both the statement of the case and in the argument reference to the place in the record where the issue presented for decision on appeal has been raised or preserved below.

   See Rule 1551 (Scope of Review) as to requisites for reviewable issue on petition for review.

Source

   The provisions of this Rule 302 amended February 27, 1980, 10 Pa.B. 1038, effective as set forth at 10 Pa.B. 1038. Immediately preceding text appears at serial pages (42958).

INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS


Rule 311. Interlocutory Appeals as of Right.

 (a)  General rule.An appeal may be taken as of right and without reference to Pa.R.A.P. 341(c) from:

   (1)  Affecting judgments.—An order refusing to open, vacate, or strike off a judgment. If orders opening, vacating, or striking off a judgment are sought in the alternative, no appeal may be filed until the court has disposed of each claim for relief.

   (2)  Attachments, etc.—An order confirming, modifying, dissolving, or refusing to confirm, modify or dissolve an attachment, custodianship, receivership, or similar matter affecting the possession or control of property, except for orders pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § §  3323(f), 3505(a).

   (3)  Change of criminal venue or venire.—An order changing venue or venire in a criminal proceeding.

   (4)  Injunctions.—An order that grants or denies, modifies or refuses to modify, continues or refuses to continue, or dissolves or refuses to dissolve an injunction unless the order was entered:

     (i)   Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § §  3323(f), 3505(a); or

     (ii)   After a trial but before entry of the final order. Such order is immediately appealable, however, if the order enjoins conduct previously permitted or mandated or permits or mandates conduct not previously mandated or permitted, and is effective before entry of the final order.

   (5)  Peremptory judgment in mandamus.—An order granting peremptory judgment in mandamus.

   (6)  New trials.—An order in a civil action or proceeding awarding a new trial, or an order in a criminal proceeding awarding a new trial where the defendant claims that the proper disposition of the matter would be an absolute discharge or where the Commonwealth claims that the trial court committed an error of law.

   (7)  Partition.—An order directing partition.

   (8)  Other cases.—An order that is made final or appealable by statute or general rule, even though the order does not dispose of all claims and of all parties.

 (b)  Order sustaining venue or personal or in rem jurisdiction.—An appeal may be taken as of right from an order in a civil action or proceeding sustaining the venue of the matter or jurisdiction over the person or over real or personal property if:

   (1)  the plaintiff, petitioner, or other party benefiting from the order files of record within ten days after the entry of the order an election that the order shall be deemed final; or

   (2)  the court states in the order that a substantial issue of venue or jurisdiction is presented.

 (c)  Changes of venue, etc.—An appeal may be taken as of right from an order in a civil action or proceeding changing venue, transferring the matter to another court of coordinate jurisdiction, or declining to proceed in the matter on the basis of forum non conveniens or analogous principles.

 (d)  Commonwealth appeals in criminal cases.—In a criminal case, under the circumstances provided by law, the Commonwealth may take an appeal as of right from an order that does not end the entire case where the Commonwealth certifies in the notice of appeal that the order will terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution.

 (e)  Orders overruling preliminary objections in eminent domain cases.—An appeal may be taken as of right from an order overruling preliminary objections to a declaration of taking and an order overruling preliminary objections to a petition for appointment of a board of viewers.

 (f)  Administrative remand.—An appeal may be taken as of right from: (1) an order of a common pleas court or government unit remanding a matter to an administrative agency or hearing officer for execution of the adjudication of the reviewing tribunal in a manner that does not require the exercise of administrative discretion; or (2) an order of a common pleas court or government unit remanding a matter to an administrative agency or hearing officer that decides an issue that would ultimately evade appellate review if an immediate appeal is not allowed.

 (g)  Waiver of objections.

   (1)  Except as provided in subparagraphs (g)(1)(ii), (iii), and (iv), failure to file an appeal of an interlocutory order does not waive any objections to the interlocutory order:

     (i)   (Rescinded).

     (ii)   Failure to file an appeal from an interlocutory order under subparagraph (b)(1) or paragraph (c) of this rule shall constitute a waiver of all objections to jurisdiction over the person or over the property involved or to venue, etc., and the question of jurisdiction or venue shall not be considered on any subsequent appeal.

     (iii)   Failure to file an appeal from an interlocutory order under paragraph (e) of this rule shall constitute a waiver of all objections to such an order.

     (iv)   Failure to file an appeal from an interlocutory order refusing to compel arbitration, appealable under 42 Pa.C.S. §  7320(a)(1) and subparagraph (a)(8) of this rule, shall constitute a waiver of all objections to such an order.

   (2)  Where no election that an interlocutory order shall be deemed final is filed under subparagraph (b)(1) of this rule, the objection may be raised on any subsequent appeal.

 (h)  Further proceedings in the trial court.—Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a) shall not be applicable to a matter in which an interlocutory order is appealed under subparagraphs (a)(2) or (a)(4) of this rule.

   Official Note

   Authority—This rule implements 42 Pa.C.S. §  5105(c), which provides:

   

   c) Interlocutory appeals. There shall be a right of appeal from such interlocutory orders of tribunals and other government units as may be specified by law. The governing authority shall be responsible for a continuous review of the operation of section 702(b) (relating to interlocutory appeals by permission) and shall from time to time establish by general rule rights to appeal from such classes of interlocutory orders, if any, from which appeals are regularly permitted pursuant to section 702(b).

   The appeal rights under this rule and under Pa.R.A.P. 312, Pa.R.A.P. 313, Pa.R.A.P. 341, and Pa.R.A.P. 342 are cumulative; and no inference shall be drawn from the fact that two or more rules may be applicable to an appeal from a given order.

   Paragraph (a)—If an order falls under Pa.R.A.P. 311, an immediate appeal may be taken as of right simply by filing a notice of appeal. The procedures set forth in Pa.R.A.P. 341(c) and 1311 do not apply to an appeal under Pa.R.A.P. 311.

   Subparagraph (a)(1)—The 1989 amendment to subparagraph (a)(1) eliminated interlocutory appeals of right from orders opening, vacating, or striking off a judgment while retaining the right of appeal from an order refusing to take any such action.

   Subparagraph (a)(2)—The 1987 Amendment to subparagraph (a)(2) is consistent with appellate court decisions disallowing interlocutory appeals in matrimonial matters. Fried v. Fried, 501 A.2d 211 (Pa. 1985); O’Brien v. O’Brien, 519 A.2d 511 (Pa. Super. 1987).

   Subparagraph (a)(3)—Change of venire is authorized by 42 Pa.C.S. §  8702. Pa.R.Crim.P. 584 treats changes of venue and venire the same. Thus an order changing venue or venire is appealable by the defendant or the Commonwealth, while an order refusing to change venue or venire is not.

   See also Pa.R.A.P. 903(c)(1) regarding time for appeal.

   Subparagraph (a)(4)—The 1987 amendment to subparagraph (a)(4) is consistent with appellate court decisions disallowing interlocutory appeals in matrimonial matters. Fried v. Fried, 501 A.2d 211, 215 (Pa. 1985); O’Brien v. O’Brien, 519 A.2d 511, 514 (Pa. Super. 1987).

   The 1996 amendment to subparagraph (a)(4) reconciled two conflicting lines of cases by adopting the position that generally an appeal may not be taken from a decree nisi granting or denying a permanent injunction.

   The 2009 amendment to the rule conformed the rule to the 2003 amendments to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure abolishing actions in equity and thus eliminating the decree nisi. Because decrees nisi were in general not appealable to the extent they were not effective immediately upon entry, this principle has been expressly incorporated into the body of the rule as applicable to any injunction.

   Subparagraph (a)(5)—Subparagraph (a)(5), added in 1996, authorizes an interlocutory appeal as of right from an order granting a motion for peremptory judgment in mandamus without the condition precedent of a motion to open the peremptory judgment in mandamus. An order denying a motion for peremptory judgment in mandamus remains unappealable.

   Subparagraph (a)(8)—Subparagraph (a)(8) recognizes that orders that are procedurally interlocutory may be made appealable by statute or general rule. For example, see 27 Pa.C.S. §  8303. The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, etc., should also be consulted.

   Following a 2005 amendment to Pa.R.A.P. 311, orders determining the validity of a will or trust were appealable as of right under former subparagraph (a)(8). Pursuant to the 2011 amendments to Pa.R.A.P. 342, such orders are now immediately appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 342(a)(2).

   Paragraph (b)—Paragraph (b) is based in part on the Act of March 5, 1925, P. L. 23. The term ‘‘civil action or proceeding’’ is broader than the term ‘‘proceeding at law or in equity’’ under the prior practice and is intended to include orders entered by the orphans’ court division. Cf. In the Matter of Phillips, 370 A.2d 307 (Pa. 1977).

   In subparagraph (b)(1), a plaintiff is given a qualified (because it can be overridden by petition for and grant of permission to appeal under Pa.R.A.P. 312) option to gamble that the venue of the matter or personal or in rem jurisdiction will be sustained on appeal. Subparagraph (g)(1)(ii) provides that if the plaintiff timely elects final treatment, the failure of the defendant to appeal constitutes a waiver. The appeal period under Pa.R.A.P. 903 ordinarily runs from the entry of the order, and not from the date of filing of the election, which procedure will ordinarily afford at least 20 days within which to appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(c) as to treatment of special appeal times. If the plaintiff does not file an election to treat the order as final, the case will proceed to trial unless (1) the trial court makes a finding under subparagraph (b)(2) of the existence of a substantial question of jurisdiction and the defendant elects to appeal, (2) an interlocutory appeal is permitted under Pa.R.A.P. 312, or (3) another basis for appeal appears, for example, under subparagraph (a)(1), and an appeal is taken. Presumably, a plaintiff would file such an election where plaintiff desires to force the defendant to decide promptly whether the objection to venue or jurisdiction will be seriously pressed. Paragraph (b) does not cover orders that do not sustain jurisdiction because they are, of course, final orders appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 341.

   Subparagraph (b)(2)—The 1989 amendment to subparagraph (b)(2) permits an interlocutory appeal as of right where the trial court certifies that a substantial question of venue is present. This eliminated an inconsistency formerly existing between paragraph (b) and subparagraph (b)(2).

   Paragraph (c)—Paragraph (c) is based in part on the act of March 5, 1925 (P. L. 23, No. 15). The term ‘‘civil action or proceeding’’ is broader than the term ‘‘proceeding at law or in equity’’ under the prior practice and is intended to include orders entered by the orphans’ court division. Cf. In the Matter of Phillips, 370 A.2d 307, 308 (Pa. 1977).

   Paragraph (c) covers orders that do not sustain venue, such as orders under Pa.R.C.P. 1006(d) and (e).

   However, the paragraph does not relate to a transfer under 42 Pa.C.S. §  933(c)(1), 42 Pa.C.S. §  5103, or any other similar provision of law, because such a transfer is not to a ‘‘court of coordinate jurisdiction’’ within the meaning of this rule; it is intended that there shall be no right of appeal from a transfer order based on improper subject matter jurisdiction. Such orders may be appealed by permission under Pa.R.A.P. 312, or an appeal as of right may be taken from an order dismissing the matter for lack of jurisdiction. See Balshy v. Rank, 490 A.2d 415, 416 (Pa. 1985).

   Other orders relating to subject matter jurisdiction (which for this purpose does not include questions as to the form of action, such as between law and equity, or divisional assignment, see 42 Pa.C.S. §  952 will be appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 341 if jurisdiction is not sustained, and otherwise will be subject to Pa.R.A.P. 312.

   Paragraph (d)—Pursuant to paragraph (d), the Commonwealth has a right to take an appeal from an interlocutory order provided that the Commonwealth certifies in the notice of appeal that the order terminates or substantially handicaps the prosecution. See Pa.R.A.P. 904(e). This rule supersedes Commonwealth v. Dugger, 486 A.2d 382, 386 (Pa. 1985). Commonwealth v. Dixon, 907 A.2d 468, 471 n.8 (Pa. 2006).

   Paragraph (f)—Pursuant to paragraph (f), there is an immediate appeal as of right from an order of a common pleas court or government unit remanding a matter to an administrative agency or hearing officer for execution of the adjudication of the reviewing tribunal in a manner that does not require the exercise of administrative discretion. Examples of such orders include: a remand by a court of common pleas to the Department of Transportation for removal of points from a drivers license; and an order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board reinstating compensation benefits and remanding to a referee for computation of benefits.

   Paragraph (f) further permits immediate appeal from an order of a common pleas court or government unit remanding a matter to an administrative agency or hearing officer that decides an issue that would ultimately evade appellate review if an immediate appeal is not allowed. See Lewis v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 690 A.2d 814, 816 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997).

   Subparagraph (g)(1)(iv)—Subparagraph (g)(1)(iv), added in 2015, addresses waiver in the context of appeals from various classes of arbitration orders. All six types of arbitration orders identified in 42 Pa.C.S. §  7320(a) are immediately appealable as of right. Differing principles govern these orders, some of which are interlocutory and some of which are final. The differences affect whether an order is appealable under this rule or Pa.R.A.P. 341(b) and whether an immediate appeal is necessary to avoid waiver of objections to the order.

   • Section 7320(a)(1)—An interlocutory order refusing to compel arbitration under 42 Pa.C.S. §  7320(a)(1) is immediately appealable pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(8). Failure to appeal the interlocutory order immediately waives all objections to it. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(g)(1)(iv). This supersedes the holding in Cooke v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 723 A.2d 723, 726 (Pa. Super. 1999). Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(8) and former Pa.R.A.P. 311(g)(1)(i) require a finding of waiver based on failure to appeal the denial order when entered).

   • Section 7320(a)(2)—Failure to appeal an interlocutory order granting an application to stay arbitration under 42 Pa.C.S. §  7304(b) does not waive the right to contest the stay; an aggrieved party may appeal such an order immediately under Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(8) or challenge the order on appeal from the final judgment.

   • Section 7320(a)(3)—(a)(6)—If an order is appealable under 42 Pa.C.S. §  7320(a)(3), (4), (5), or (6) because it is final, that is, the order disposes of all claims and of all parties, see Pa.R.A.P. 341(b), failure to appeal immediately waives all issues. If the order does not dispose of all claims or of all parties, then the order is interlocutory. An aggrieved party may appeal such an order immediately under Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(8) or challenge the order on appeal from the final judgment.

   Paragraph (h)See note to Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a).

Source

   The provisions of this Rule 311 amended June 28, 1985, effective July 20, 1985, 15 Pa.B. 2635; amended December 30, 1987, effective January 16, 1988 and shall govern all matters thereafter commenced and, insofar as just and practicable, matters then pending, 18 Pa.B. 245; amended March 31, 1989, effective July 1, 1989, 19 Pa.B. 1721; amended March 12, 1992, effective July 6, 1992, and shall govern all matters thereafter commenced, 22 Pa.B. 1354; amended May 6, 1992, effective July 6, 1992, 22 Pa.B. 2675; amended April 10, 1996, effective April 27, 1996, 26 Pa.B. 1985; amended June 29, 2005, effective 60 days after publication, 35 Pa.B. 3897; amended October 14, 2009, effective 30 days after publication 39 Pa.B. 6324; amended December 29, 2011, effective and applicable to all Orphans’ Court orders entered forty-five days after adoption, 42 Pa.B. 374; amended December 29, 2011, effective and applicable to all Orphans’ Court orders entered forty-five days after adoption, 42 Pa.B. 4693; amended December 14, 2015, effective April 1, 2016, for all orders entered on or after that date, 46 Pa.B. 8. Immediately preceding text appears at serial pages (363208) to (363212) and (367329).

Rule 312. Interlocutory Appeals by Permission.

 An appeal from an interlocutory order may be taken by permission pursuant to Chapter 13 (interlocutory appeals by permission).

Rule 313. Collateral Orders.

 (a)  General Rule. An appeal may be taken as of right from a collateral order of an administrative agency or lower court.

 (b)  Definition. A collateral order is an order separable from and collateral to the main cause of action where the right involved is too important to be denied review and the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.

   Official Note

   Rule 313 is a codification of existing case law with respect to collateral orders. See Pugar v. Greco, 483 Pa. 68, 73, 394 A.2d 542, 545 (1978) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949)). Examples of collateral orders include orders denying pre-trial motions to dismiss based on double jeopardy in which the court does not find the motion frivolous, Commonwealth v. Brady, 510 Pa. 336, 508 A.2d 286, 289—91 (1986) (allowing an immediate appeal from denial of double jeopardy claim under collateral order doctrine where trial court does not make a finding of frivolousness); if the trial court finds the motion frivolous, the defendant may secure review only by first filing a petition for review under Pa.R.A.P. 1573. See Commonwealth v. Orie, 22 A.3d 1021 (Pa. 2011). Other examples of collateral orders are an order denying a petition to permit the payment of death taxes, Hankin v. Hankin, 338 Pa. Super. 442, 487 A.2d 1363 (1985); and an order denying a petition for removal of an executor, Re: Estate of Georgianna, 312 Pa. Super. 339, 458 A.2d 989 (1983), aff’d, 504 Pa. 510, 475 A.2d 744. Thorough discussions of the collateral order doctrine as it has been applied by Pennsylvania appellate courts are found in the following sources: Darlington, McKeon, Schuckers and Brown, 1 Pennsylvania Appellate Practice Second Edition, § §  313:1—313:201 (1994) and Byer, Appealable Orders under the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedures in Practice and Procedures in Pennsylvania Appellate Courts (PBI No. 1994-869); Pines, Pennsylvania Appellate Practice: Procedural Requirements and the Vagaries of Jurisdiction, 91 Dick.L.Rev. 55, 107—115 (1986).

   If an order falls under Rule 313, an immediate appeal may be taken as of right simply by filing a notice of appeal. The procedures set forth in Rules 341(c) and 1311 do not apply under Rule 313.

Source

   The provisions of this Rule 313 adopted March 12, 1992, effective July 6, 1992, and shall govern all matters thereafter commenced; amended May 6, 1992, effective July 6, 1992, 22 Pa.B. 2675; amended July 7, 1997, effective in 60 days, 27 Pa.B. 3503; corrected August 8, 1997, 27 Pa.B. 3995; amended June 4, 2013, effective July 4, 2013, 43 Pa.B. 3327. Immediately preceding text appears at serial pages (363213) to (363214).

FINAL ORDERS


Rule 341. Final Orders; Generally.

 (a)  General Rule.—Except as prescribed in paragraphs (d) and (e) of this rule, an appeal may be taken as of right from any final order of a government unit or trial court.

 (b)  Definition of Final Order.—A final order is any order that:

   (1)  disposes of all claims and of all parties; or

   (2)  (Rescinded).

   (3)  is entered as a final order pursuant to paragraph (c) of this rule.

 (c)  Determination of finality.—When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim or when multiple parties are involved, the trial court or other government unit may enter a final order as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims and parties only upon an express determination that an immediate appeal would facilitate resolution of the entire case. Such an order becomes appealable when entered. In the absence of such a determination and entry of a final order, any order or other form of decision that adjudicates fewer than all the claims and parties shall not constitute a final order. In addition, the following conditions shall apply:

   (1)  The trial court or other government unit is required to act on an application for a determination of finality under paragraph (c) within 30 days of entry of the order. During the time an application for a determination of finality is pending the action is stayed.

   (2)  A notice of appeal may be filed within 30 days after entry of an order as amended unless a shorter time period is provided in Pa.R.A.P. 903(c). Any denial of such an application shall be reviewable only for abuse of discretion pursuant to Chapter 15.

   (3)  Unless the trial court or other government unit acts on the application within 30 days of entry of the order, the trial court or other government unit shall no longer consider the application and it shall be deemed denied.

   (4)  The time for filing a petition for review will begin to run from the date of entry of the order denying the application for a determination of finality or, if the application is deemed denied, from the 31st day. A petition for review may be filed within 30 days of the entry of the order denying the application or within 30 days of the deemed denial unless a shorter time period is provided by Pa.R.A.P. 1512(b).

 (d)  Superior Court and Commonwealth Court Orders.—Except as prescribed by Pa.R.A.P. 1101 no appeal may be taken as of right from any final order of the Superior Court or of the Commonwealth Court.

 (e)  Criminal Orders.—An appeal may be taken by the Commonwealth from any final order in a criminal matter only in the circumstances provided by law.

   Official Note

   Related Constitutional and Statutory Provisions—Section 9 of Article V of the Constitution of Pennsylvania provides that ‘‘there shall be a right of appeal from a court of record or from an administrative agency to a court of record or to an appellate court.’’ The constitutional provision is implemented by 2 Pa.C.S. §  702, 2 Pa.C.S. §  752, and 42 Pa.C.S. §  5105.

   Criminal Law Proceedings—Commonwealth Appeals—Orders formerly appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 341 by the Commonwealth in criminal cases as heretofore provided by law, but which do not dispose of the entire case, are now appealable as interlocutory appeals as of right under paragraph (d) of Pa.R.A.P. 311.

   Final Orders—Pre- and Post-1992 Practice—The 1992 amendment generally eliminates appeals as of right under Pa.R.A.P. 341 from orders not ending the litigation as to all claims and as to all parties. Formerly, there was case law that orders not ending the litigation as to all claims and all parties are final orders if such orders have the practical consequence of putting a litigant out of court.

   A party needs to file only a single notice of appeal to secure review of prior non-final orders that are made final by the entry of a final order, see K.H. v. J.R., 826 A.2d 863, 870-71 (Pa. 2003) (following trial); Betz v. Pneumo Abex LLC, 44 A.3d 27, 54 (Pa. 2012) (summary judgment). Where, however, one or more orders resolves issues arising on more than one docket or relating to more than one judgment, separate notices of appeal must be filed. Commonwealth v. C.M.K., 932 A.2d 111, 113 & n.3 (Pa. Super. 2007) (quashing appeal taken by single notice of appeal from order on remand for consideration under Pa.R.Crim.P. 607 of two persons’ judgments of sentence).

   The 1997 amendments to paragraphs (a) and (c), substituting the conjunction ‘‘and’’ for ‘‘or,’’ are not substantive. The amendments merely clarify that by definition any order which disposes of all claims will dispose of all parties and any order that disposes of all parties will dispose of all claims.

   Rescission of subparagraph (b)(2)—The 2015 rescission of subparagraph (b)(2) eliminated a potential waiver trap created by legislative use of the adjective ‘‘final’’ to describe orders that were procedurally interlocutory but nonetheless designated as appealable as of right. Failure to appeal immediately an interlocutory order deemed final by statute waived the right to challenge the order on appeal from the final judgment. Rescinding subparagraph (b)(2) eliminated this potential waiver of the right to appeal. If an order designated as appealable by a statute disposes of all claims and of all parties, it is appealable as a final order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 341. If the order does not meet that standard, then it is interlocutory regardless of the statutory description. Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(8) provides for appeal as of right from an order that is made final or appealable by statute or general rule, even though the order does not dispose of all claims or of all parties and, thus, is interlocutory; Pa.R.A.P. 311(g) addresses waiver if no appeal is taken immediately from such interlocutory order.

   One of the further effects of the rescission of subparagraph (b)(2) is to change the basis for appealability of orders that do not end the case but grant or deny a declaratory judgment. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wickett, 763 A.2d 813, 818 (Pa. 2000); Pa. Bankers Ass’n v. Pa. Dep’t. of Banking, 948 A.2d 790, 798 (Pa. 2008). The effect of the rescission is to eliminate waiver for failure to take an immediate appeal from such an order. A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order granting or denying a declaratory judgment, where the order satisfies the criteria for ‘‘finality’’ under Pennsylvania Bankers Association, may elect to proceed under Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(8) or wait until the end of the case and proceed under subparagraph (b)(1) of this rule.

   An arbitration order appealable under 42 Pa.C.S. §  7320(a) may be interlocutory or final. If it disposes of all claims and all parties, it is final and, thus, appealable pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 341. If the order does not dispose of all claims and all parties, that is, the order is not final, but rather interlocutory, it is appealable pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311. Failure to appeal an interlocutory order appealable as of right may result in waiver of objections to the order. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(g).

   Paragraph (c)—Determination of Finality—Paragraph (c) permits an immediate appeal from an order dismissing less than all claims or parties from a case only upon an express determination that an immediate appeal would facilitate resolution of the entire case. Factors to be considered under paragraph (c) include, but are not limited to:

    (1) whether there is a significant relationship between adjudicated and unadjudicated claims;

    (2) whether there is a possibility that an appeal would be mooted by further developments;

    (3) whether there is a possibility that the court or government unit will consider issues a second time; and

    (4) whether an immediate appeal will enhance prospects of settlement.

   The failure of a party to apply to the government unit or trial court for a determination of finality pursuant to paragraph (c) shall not constitute a waiver and the matter may be raised in a subsequent appeal following the entry of a final order disposing of all claims and all parties.

   Where the government unit or trial court refuses to amend its order to include the express determination that an immediate appeal would facilitate resolution of the entire case and refuses to enter a final order, a petition for review under Chapter 15 of the unappealable order of denial is the exclusive mode of review to determine whether the case is so egregious as to justify prerogative appellate correction of the exercise of discretion by the lower tribunal. See, e.g., Pa.R.A.P. 1311, Official Note. The filing of such a petition for review does not prevent the trial court or other government unit from proceeding further with the matter pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(6). Of course, as in any case, the appellant could apply for a discretionary stay of the proceeding below.

   Subparagraph (c)(2) provides for a stay of the action pending determination of an application for a determination of finality. If a petition for review is filed challenging denial, a stay or supersedeas will issue only as provided under Chapter 17 of these rules.

   In the event that a trial court or other government unit enters a final order pursuant to paragraph (c) of this rule, the trial court or other government unit may no longer proceed further in the matter, except as provided in Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(1)—(5).

   The following is a partial list of orders previously interpreted by the courts as appealable as final orders under Pa.R.A.P. 341 that are no longer appealable as of right unless the trial court or government unit makes an express determination that an immediate appeal would facilitate resolution of the entire case and expressly enters a final order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 341(c):

    (1) an order dismissing one of several causes of action pleaded in a complaint but leaving pending other causes of action;

    (2) an order dismissing a complaint but leaving pending a counterclaim;

    (3) an order dismissing a counterclaim but leaving pending the complaint that initiated the action;

    (4) an order dismissing an action as to less than all plaintiffs or as to less than all defendants but leaving pending the action as to other plaintiffs and other defendants;

    (5) an order granting judgment against one defendant but leaving pending the complaint against other defendants; and

    (6) an order dismissing a complaint to join an additional defendant or denying a petition to join an additional defendant or denying a petition for late joinder of an additional defendant.

   The 1997 amendment adding subparagraph (c)(3) provided for a deemed denial where the trial court or other government unit fails to act on the application within 30 days.

Source

   The provisions of this Rule 341 amended through April 26, 1982, effective September 12, 1982, 12 Pa.B. 1536; amended March 12, 1992, effective July 6, 1992, and shall govern all matters thereafter commenced, 22 Pa.B. 1354; corrected May 1, 1992, effective July 6, 1992, and shall govern all matters thereafter commenced, 22 Pa.B. 2315; amended May 6, 1992, effective July 6, 1992, 22 Pa.B. 2675; amended July 7, 1997, effective in 60 days, 27 Pa.B. 3503; amended October 13, 2006, effective 60 days after adoption, 36 Pa.B. 6507; amended April 16, 2013, effective to appeals and petitions for review filed 30 days after adoption, 43 Pa.B. 2423; amended May 28, 2014, effective July 1, 2014, 44 Pa.B. 3493; amended December 14, 2015, effective April 1, 2016, for all orders entered on or after that date, 46 Pa.B. 8. Immediately preceding text appears at serial pages (367330) and (372649) to (372651).

Rule 342. (Rescinded).


Source

   The provisions of this Rule 342 amended December 11, 1978, effective December 30, 1978, 8 Pa.B. 3802; amended December 20, 2000, effective January 1, 2001, 31 Pa.B. 7; amended June 29, 2005, effective 60 days after adoption, 35 Pa.B. 3897; rescinded December 29, 2011, effective and applicable to all Orphans’ Court orders entered forty-five days after adoption, 42 Pa.B. 374; amended December 29, 2011, effective and applicable to all Orphans’ Court orders entered forty-five days after adoption, 42 Pa.B. 4693. Immediately preceding text appears at serial page (360244).

Rule 342. Appealable Orphans’ Court Orders.

 (a)  General rule. An appeal may be taken as of right from the following orders of the Orphans’ Court Division:

   (1)  An order confirming an account, or authorizing or directing a distribution from an estate or trust;

   (2)  An order determining the validity of a will or trust;

   (3)  An order interpreting a will or a document that forms the basis of a claim against an estate or trust;

   (4)  An order interpreting, modifying, reforming or terminating a trust;

   (5)  An order determining the status of fiduciaries, beneficiaries, or creditors in an estate, trust, or guardianship;

   (6)  An order determining an interest in real or personal property;

   (7)  An order issued after an inheritance tax appeal has been taken to the Orphans’ Court pursuant to either 72 Pa.C.S. §  9186(a)(3) or 72 Pa.C.S. §  9188, or after the Orphans’ Court has made a determination of the issue protested after the record has been removed from the Department of Revenue pursuant to 72 Pa.C.S. §  9188(a); or

   (8)  An order otherwise appealable as provided by Chapter 3 of these rules.

 (b)  Definitions. As used in this rule:

   (1)  ‘‘estate’’ includes the estate of a decedent, minor, incapacitated person, or principal under Chapters 33, 35, 51, 55 and 56 of Title 20 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes (‘‘Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code’’) (‘‘PEF Code’’);

   (2)  ‘‘trust’’ includes inter vivos and testamentary trusts and the ‘‘custodial property’’ under Chapters 53 and 77 of the PEF Code; and

   (3)  ‘‘guardianship’’ includes guardians of the person for both minors and incapacitated persons under Chapters 51 and 55 of the PEF Code.

 (c)  Waiver of objections. Failure to appeal an order that is immediately appealable under paragraphs (a)(1)—(7) of this rule shall constitute a waiver of all objections to such order and such objections may not be raised in any subsequent appeal.

   Official Note

   In 1992, the Supreme Court amended Rule 341 to make clear that, as a general rule, a final order is an order that ends a case as to all claims and all parties. Because of this amendment, many Orphans’ Court orders that may have been considered constructive final orders prior to 1992 became unappealable interlocutory orders. Although some Orphans’ Court orders were construed by case law to be appealable as collateral orders, see Estate of Petro, 694 A.2d 627 (Pa. Super. 1997), the collateral order doctrine was neither consistently applied nor was it applicable to other Orphans’ Court orders that previously had been considered final under the ‘‘final aspect’’ doctrine. See, e.g. Estate of Habazin, 679 A.2d 1293 (Pa. Super. 1996).

   In response, the Supreme Court revised Rule 342 that initially permitted appeals from Orphans’ Court orders concerning distribution even if the order was not considered final under the definition of Rule 341(b). In 2001, Rule 342 was amended to also allow appeals from orders determining an interest in realty or personalty or the status of individuals or entities, in additional to orders of distribution, if the Orphans’ Court judge made a determination that the particular order should be treated as final. In 2005, the Supreme Court amended Rule 342 again, adding subdivision (2) to clarify that Rule 342 was not the exclusive method of appealing Orphans’ Court orders.

   Also, in 2005, the Supreme Court amended Rule 311 to provide for an interlocutory appeal as of right from an order determining the validity of a will or trust. See former Rule 311(a)(8). Such an order needed to be immediately appealable and given finality so that the orderly administration of the estate or trust could proceed appropriately.

   Since 2005, it has become apparent that other adversarial disputes arise during the administration of an estate, trust or guardianship, and that orders adjudicating these disputes also must be resolved with finality so that the ordinary and routine administration of the estate, trust or guardianship can continue. See Estate of Stricker, 602 Pa. 54, 63-64, 977 A.2d 1115, 1120 (2009) (Saylor, J., concurring). Experience has proven that the determination of finality procedure in subdivision (1) of Rule 342 is not workable and has been applied inconsistently around the Commonwealth. See id. (citing Commonwealth v. Castillo, 585 Pa. 395, 401, 888 A.2d 775, 779 (2005) (rejecting the exercise of discretion in permitting appeals to proceed)).

   Experience has also proven that it is difficult to analogize civil litigation to litigation arising in estate, trust and guardianship administration. The civil proceeding defines the scope of the dispute, but the administration of a trust or estate does not define the scope of the litigation in Orphans’ Court. Administration of a trust or an estate continues over a period of time. Litigation in Orphans’ Court may arise at some point during the administration, and when it does arise, the dispute needs to be determined promptly and with finality so that the guardianship or the estate or trust administration can then continue properly and orderly. Thus, the traditional notions of finality that are applicable in the context of ongoing civil adversarial proceedings do not correspond to litigation in Orphans’ Court.

   In order to facilitate orderly administration of estates, trusts and guardianships, the 2011 amendments list certain orders that will be immediately appealable without any requirement that the Orphans’ Court make a determination of finality. Orders falling within subdivisions (a)(1)—(7) no longer require the lower court to make a determination of finality.

   Subdivisions (a)(1)—(7) list orders that are unique to Orphans’ Court practice, but closely resemble final orders as defined in Rule 341(b). Subdivision (a)(1) provides that the adjudication of any account, even an interim or partial account, is appealable. Previously, only the adjudication of the final account would have been appealable as a final order under Rule 341. The prior limitation has proven unworkable for estate administration taking years and trusts established for generations during which interim and partial accounts may be adjudicated and confirmed. The remainder of subdivision (a)(1) permits appeals from orders of distribution as Rule 342 always has permitted since its initial adoption. Subdivision (a)(2) is a new placement for orders determining the validity of a will or trust that previously were appealable as interlocutory appeals as of right following the 2005 amendment to Rule 311. See prior Rule 311(a)(8). Subdivision (a)(3) is a new provision that allows an immediate appeal from an order interpreting a will or other relevant document that forms the basis of a claim asserted against an estate or trust. Such orders can include, among other things, an order determining that a particular individual is or is not a beneficiary or determining if an underlying agreement executed by the decedent during life creates rights against the estate. Subdivision (a)(4) addresses trusts and is similar to subdivision (a)(3), but also permits immediate appeals from orders modifying, reforming or terminating a trust since such judicial actions are now permitted under 20 Pa.C.S. §  7740 et seq. Subdivision (a)(5) is intended to clarify prior Rule 342 in several respects: First, an appealable Orphans’ Court order concerning the status of individuals or entities means an order determining if an individual or entity is a fiduciary, beneficiary or creditor, such as an order determining if the alleged creditor has a valid claim against the estate. Second, such orders include orders pertaining to trusts and guardianships as well as estates. Finally, this subdivision resolves a conflict in prior appellate court decisions by stating definitively that an order removing or refusing to remove a fiduciary is an immediately appealable order. Subdivision (a)(6) retains the same language from prior Rule 342. Subdivision (a)(7) permits appeals of an Orphans’ Court order concerning an inheritance tax appraisement, assessment, allowance or disallowance when such order is issued separately and not in conjunction with the adjudication of an account. Sections 9186 and 9188 of Chapter 72 provide three procedures, outside the context of an accounting, whereby either the personal representative or the Department of Revenue may bring before the Orphans’ Court a dispute over inheritance taxes imposed. See also Estate of Gail B. Jones, 796 A.2d 1003 (Pa. Super. 2002) (analogizing a petition regarding the apportionment of inheritance taxes to a declaratory judgment petition given that an estate account had not yet been filed). A decision concerning inheritance taxes issued in conjunction with the adjudication of an account would be appealable under subdivision (a)(1).

   In keeping with the 2005 amendment that added subdivision (2) to prior Rule 342, subdivision (a)(8) tracks subdivision (2) of former Rule 342. Subdivision (2) was adopted in response to Estate of Sorber, 2002 Pa. Super. 226, 803 A.2d 767 (2002), a panel decision holding that Rule 342 precluded immediate appeals from orders that would have otherwise been appealable as collateral orders under Rule 313 unless the Orphans’ Court judge made a determination of finality under Rule 342. Subdivision (a)(8) makes clear that Rule 342, as amended, is still not the sole method of appealing an Orphans’ Court order and an order not otherwise immediately appealable under Rule 342 may still be immediately appealable if it meets the criteria under another rule in Chapter 3 of these rules. Examples would include injunctions appealable under Rule 311(a)(4), Interlocutory Orders Appealable by Permission under Rules 312 and 1311, Collateral Orders appealable under Rule 313, and an order approving a final accounting which is a true final order under Rule 341. Whether or not such orders require certification or a further determination of finality by the trial court depends on the applicable rule in Chapter 3. Compare Rules 311(a)(4), 313 and 341(c) with Rules 312 and 1311.

   Failure to appeal an order that is immediately appealable under subdivisions (a)(1)—(7) of this rule shall constitute a waiver of all objections to such order and may not be raised in any subsequent appeal. See Subdivision (c) of this Rule. The consequences of failing to appeal an Orphans’ Court order under (a)(8) will depend on whether such order falls within Rules 311, 312, 313, 1311 or 341.

Source

   The provisions of this Rule 342 adopted December 29, 2011, effective and applicable to all Orphans’ Court orders entered forty-five days after adoption, 42 Pa.B. 374; amended December 29, 2011, effective and applicable to all Orphans’ Court orders entered forty-five days after adoption, 42 Pa.B. 4693. Immediately preceding text appears at serial pages (360244) to (360246).

Rule 343. (Rescinded).


   Official Note

   The Supreme Court rescinded this Rule in 1997 as obsolete in view of the changes to the Rules of Criminal Procedure rescinding Pa.R.Crim.P. 321 and adopting new Pa.R.Crim.P. 1410, effective as to cases in which the determination of guilt occurs on or after January 1, 1994. See Criminal Procedural Rules Committee Final Report at 620—621 A.2d (Pennsylvania Reporter Series) pages CVIII—CXXXIII.

Source

   The provisions of this Rule 343 adopted June 29, 1977, effective September 1, 1977, 7 Pa.B. 2112, amended May 22, 1978, effective July 1, 1978, 8 Pa.B. 1612; amended July 7, 1997, effective in 60 days, 27 Pa.B. 3503. Immediately preceding text appears at serial pages (214295) to (214296).



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