Rule 600. Prompt Trial.

 (A)(1)  Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the defendant after June 30, 1973 but before July 1, 1974 shall commence no later than 270 days from the date on which the complaint is filed.

   (2)  Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the defendant, when the defendant is incarcerated on that case, shall commence no later than 180 days from the date on which the complaint is filed.

   (3)  Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the defendant, when the defendant is at liberty on bail, shall commence no later than 365 days from the date on which the complaint is filed.

   (4)  Trial in a court case that is transferred from the juvenile court to the trial or criminal division shall commence in accordance with the provision set out in paragraphs (A)(2) and (A)(3) except that the time is to run from the date of filing the transfer order.

 (B)  For the purpose of this rule, trial shall be deemed to commence on the date the trial judge calls the case to trial, or the defendant tenders a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.

 (C)  In determining the period for commencement of trial, there shall be excluded therefrom:

   (1)  the period of time between the filing of the written complaint and the defendant’s arrest, provided that the defendant could not be apprehended because his or her whereabouts were unknown and could not be determined by due diligence;

   (2)  any period of time for which the defendant expressly waives Rule 600;

   (3)  such period of delay at any stage of the proceedings as results from:

     (a)   the unavailability of the defendant or the defendant’s attorney;

     (b)   any continuance granted at the request of the defendant or the defendant’s attorney.

 (D) (1)  When a trial court has granted a new trial and no appeal has been perfected, the new trial shall commence within 120 days after the date of the order granting a new trial, if the defendant is incarcerated on that case. If the defendant has been released on bail, trial shall commence within 365 days of the trial court’s order.

   (2)  When an appellate court has remanded a case to the trial court, if the defendant is incarcerated on that case, trial shall commence within 120 days after the date of remand as it appears in the appellate court docket. If the defendant has been released on bail, trial shall commence within 365 days after the date of remand.

   (3)  When a trial court has ordered that a defendant’s participation in the ARD program be terminated pursuant to Rule 184, trial shall commence within 120 days of the termination order if the defendant is incarcerated on that case. If the defendant has been released on bail, trial shall commence within 365 days of the termination order.

 (E)  No defendant shall be held in pre-trial incarceration on a given case for a period exceeding 180 days excluding time described in paragraph (C) above. Any defendant held in excess of 180 days is entitled upon petition to immediate release on nominal bail.

 (F)  Nothing in this rule shall be construed to modify any time limit contained in any statute of limitations.

 (G)  For defendants on bail after the expiration of 365 days, at any time before trial, the defendant or the defendant’s attorney may apply to the court for an order dismissing the charges with prejudice on the ground that this rule has been violated. A copy of such motion shall be served upon the attorney for the Commonwealth, who shall also have the right to be heard thereon.

 If the court, upon hearing, shall determine that the Commonwealth exercised due diligence and that the circumstances occasioning the postponement were beyond the control of the Commonwealth, the motion to dismiss shall be denied and the case shall be listed for trial on a date certain. If, on any successive listing of the case, the Commonwealth is not prepared to proceed to trial on the date fixed, the court shall determine whether the Commonwealth exercised due diligence in attempting to be prepared to proceed to trial. If, at any time, it is determined that the Commonwealth did not exercise due diligence, the court shall dismiss the charges and discharge the defendant.

 In the event the case is dismissed pursuant to this paragraph, the court shall promptly prepare a report of continuances by the Commonwealth, and the reasons therefor, which prevented the case from coming to trial as required by this rule. Such report shall be certified by the president judge or administrative judge, shall be made part of the public record of the case, and shall be sent to the Court Administrator of Pennsylvania within 20 days of the order of discharge.

   Rule 600 was adopted in 1973 pursuant to Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 297 A.2d 127 (Pa. 1972).

   The time limits of this rule were amended on December 31, 1987, effective immediately. See Commonwealth v. Palmer, 558 A.2d 882 (Pa. Super. 1989).

   In addition to amending the time limits of the rule, the Court deleted the provisions concerning Commonwealth petitions to extend the time for commencement of trial. See Rule 600(E) and

   Paragraph (A)(2) requires that the Commonwealth bring a defendant to trial within 180 days from the filing of the complaint if the defendant is incarcerated on the charges. Under paragraph (E), subject to the exclusions provided in paragraph (C), a defendant who has been incarcerated on the charges pretrial for more than 180 days is entitled, upon petition, to immediate release on nominal bail.

   If a defendant is at liberty on bail on the charges, paragraph (A)(3) requires that the Commonwealth bring the defendant to trial within 365 days from the filing of a complaint. Under paragraph (G), after 365 days and at any time before trial, a defendant released on bail or the defendant’s counsel may apply to the court for an order dismissing the charges with prejudice on the ground that this rule has been violated. A copy of the motion must be served on the attorney for the Commonwealth, who has a right under this rule to be heard on the motion. If the court, upon hearing, determines that the Commonwealth exercised due diligence and that the circumstances causing the delay in the commencement of trial were beyond the Commonwealth’s control, the court must deny the motion and list the case for trial on a date certain. If the court determines that the Commonwealth did not exercise due diligence, the court must dismiss the charges with prejudice and discharge the defendant.

   When calculating the number of days set forth herein, see the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. §  1908.

   Pursuant to this rule, it is intended that ‘‘complaint’’ also includes special documents used in lieu of a complaint to initiate criminal proceedings in extraordinary circumstances such as criminal proceedings instituted by a medical examiner or coroner. See Commonwealth v. Lopinson, 234 A.2d 552 (Pa. 1967); Commonwealth v. Smouse, 594 A.2d 666 (Pa. Super. 1991).

   A trial commences when the trial judge determines that the parties are present and directs them to proceed to voir dire or to opening argument, or to the hearing of any motions which had been reserved for the time of trial, or to the taking of testimony, or to some other such first step in the trial. It is not intended that preliminary calendar calls should constitute commencement of a trial. Concerning the hearing of motions reserved for the time of trial, see Jones v. Commonwealth, 434 A.2d 1197 (Pa. 1981).

   For purposes of determining the time for commencement of trial, paragraph (C) contains the periods which must be excluded from that calculation. For periods of delay that result from the filing and litigation of omnibus pretrial motions for relief or other motions, see Commonwealth v. Hill and Commonwealth v. Cornell, 736 A.2d 578 (Pa. 1999).

   Under paragraph (C)(3)(a), in addition to any other circumstances precluding the availability of the defendant or the defendant’s attorney, the defendant should be deemed unavailable for the period of time during which the defendant contested extradition, or a responding jurisdiction delayed or refused to grant extradition; or during which the defendant was physically incapacitated or mentally incompetent to proceed; or during which the defendant was absent under compulsory process requiring his or her appearance elsewhere in connection with other judicial proceedings.

   The provisions enumerating the excludable periods contained in paragraph (C) apply to the periods for commencing a trial under paragraph (D).

   Paragraphs (D)(1) and (2) provide the time limits for commencement of trial when a trial court has granted a new trial and no appeal has been perfected, or when an appellate court has remanded a case to the trial court, for whatever reason. Under paragraph (D)(1), a trial must commence within 120 days of the trial court order granting a new trial, unless the defendant has been released on bail, in which event the trial must commence within 365 days.

   The withdrawal of, rejection of, or successful challenge to a guilty plea should be considered the granting of a new trial for purposes of this rule. Paragraph (D)(1) also applies to the period for commencing a new trial following the declaration of a mistrial.

   Under paragraph (D)(2), when an appellate court has remanded a case to the trial court, for whatever reason, trial must commence within 120 days after the remand, unless the defendant has been released on bail, in which event trial must commence within 365 days after the remand. The date of remand is the date as it appears in the appellate court docket. When remand of the record is stayed, the period for commencement of trial does not begin to run until the record is remanded as provided in this rule.

   Although a defendant’s removal from the ARD program does not result in a ‘‘new trial’’ under paragraph (D)(3), termination of the defendant’s ARD program pursuant to Rule 318 commences a new trial period for the purpose of this rule.

   When a judge grants a continuance requested by the defendant, trial should be rescheduled for a date certain consistent with the continuance request and the court’s business, and the entire period of such continuance may be excluded under paragraph (C).

   When admitted to nominal bail pursuant to this rule, the defendant must execute a bail bond. See Rules 525 and 526.

   In addition to requesting that the defendant waive Rule 600 for the period of enrollment in the ARD program (see Rule 312, paragraph (3)), the attorney for the Commonwealth may request that the defendant waive Rule 600 for the period of time spent in processing and considering the defendant’s inclusion into the ARD program.

   Official Note

   Rule 600 adopted June 8, 1973, effective prospectively as set forth in paragraphs (A)(1) and (A)(2) of this rule; paragraph (E) amended December 9, 1974, effective immediately; paragraph (E) re-amended June 28, 1976, effective July 1, 1976; amended October 22, 1981, effective January 1, 1982. (The amendment to paragraph (C)(3)(b) excluding defense-requested continuances was specifically made effective as to continuances requested on or after January 1, 1982.) Amended December 31, 1987, effective immediately; amended September 30, 1988, effective immediately; amended September 3, 1993, effective January 1, 1994; Comment revised September 13, 1995, effective January 1, 1996. The January 1, 1996 effective date extended to April 1, 1996; the April 1, 1996 effective date extended to July 1, 1996; renumbered Rule 600 and amended March 1, 2000, effective April 1, 2001; Comment revised April 20, 2000, effective July 1, 2000.

   Committee Explanatory Reports:

   Report explaining the September 3, 1993 amendments published with the Court’s Order at 23 Pa.B. 4492 (September 25, 1993).

   Final Report explaining the September 13, 1995 Comment revision published with Court’s Order at 25 Pa.B. 4116 (September 30, 1995).

   Final Report explaining the March 1, 2000 reorganization and renumbering of the rules published with the Court’s Order at 30 Pa.B. 1477 (March 18, 2000).

   Final Report explaining the April 20, 2000 Comment revision concerning Commonwealth v. Hill and Commonwealth v. Cornell, published with the Court’s Order at 30 Pa.B. 2219 (May 6, 2000).

   The provisions of this Rule 600 amended April 20, 2000, effective July 1, 2000, 30 Pa.B. 2211. Immediately preceding text appears at serial pages (264304) to (264307).